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Panel 1:  
Robotic Speech and the First Amendment 
Moderator: Professor Gregory Silverman 
Panelists: Bruce E. H. Johnson, Helen Norton, and David Skover 
Silverman: We kick off today’s symposium with a panel on Robotic 
Speech and the First Amendment. The focus of this first panel is the soon-
to-be-published book by Professors Skover and Collins. Professor David 
Skover is the Fredric C. Tausend Professor of Law here at Seattle 
University, and he will represent the authors on this morning’s panel. The 
book is Robotica.1 The first half of the book lays out an argument 
extending First Amendment protection to robotic speech. The second half 
of the book has five commentators who give their reactions to the first half, 
followed by the response of Professors Skover and Collins to the 
commentators. Our format this morning is going to mirror the structure of 
the book. I will begin by offering my own summary of the argument set 
out by Professors Skover and Collins. That will be followed by two of the 
five commentators here today, Attorney Johnson and Professor Norton. 
And then Professor Skover will offer his response to the two 
commentators. 
Attorney Bruce Johnson is one of the nation’s leading First 
Amendment litigators. He is a partner at Davis Wright Tremaine here in 
Seattle. Professor Helen Norton holds the Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in 
Constitutional Law at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Among her 
many works she has recently written an article entitled, Siri-ously? Free 
Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence.2 
The central insight and premise from which Professors Skover and 
Collins begin is that any new and effective technology of communication 
transforms society and the law by changing the calculus of its values and 
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recalibrating its notions of harm.3 The buttress that supports his claim in 
the early part of the book was the brief social history of several disruptive 
technologies of communication: scribal writing, the printing press, radio, 
television, the computer, and the internet. From the perspective of this 
history, they recognize, in the present, the emergence of a new, disruptive 
communications media: robotic communication—communication 
mediated by robots. In robotic communication, robots either communicate 
directly with human beings or act as proxies for human beings when they 
communicate with other robots. For example, on the Internet of Things, 
an intelligent refrigerator tells us that we are low on eggs and then, on our 
behalf, communicates with a robot situated on the supermarket server. So, 
we have both forms of robotic communication in that example. 
After identifying robotic communication as a new medium of 
communication, Professors Skover and Collins asked whether First 
Amendment coverage given to traditional forms of speech should be 
extended to the data processed and transmitted by robots. To answer this 
question, they distinguished robotic communications addressed to humans 
on the one hand and those transmitted to other robots on the other.  
Regarding robotic communications addressed to humans, they argue that 
First Amendment law protects words, text, images, sounds, and data 
because of its expressive meaning. Drawing on the work of reader 
response and reception theorists who claim that the meaning of a text 
arises from the interpretative acts of the reader rather than from the 
author’s intentionality or from the form of the text itself, Professors Skover 
and Collins locate the expressive meaning of the communication in the 
interpretive act of its recipient. In this respect, they see no difference 
between the expressive meaning of human and robotic speech. 
Accordingly, they conclude that robotic communication addressed to 
a human should be covered by the First Amendment because “for 
constitutional purposes, what really matters is that the receiver experiences 
robotic speech as a meaningful and potentially useful end value.”4 They 
call such robotic speech intention-less free speech and buttress their 
argument by noting how locating expressive meaning covered by the First 
Amendment in the interpretive act of the recipient explains otherwise 
inexplicable First Amendment doctrines regarding nonobscene 
pornography, corporate commercial speech, and violent video game 
speech. 
Regarding robot-to-robot communications, Professors Skover and 
Collins distinguish, at least implicitly, between those that are ultimately 
addressed to humans and those that, while not addressed to humans, are 
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initiated by them. For a chain of robot communications ultimately 
addressed to a human, they extend their earlier argument. Namely, a chain 
of robot communications ultimately received by a human being is infused 
within expressive meaning by that human recipient. And as such, the entire 
transmission chain that generated that communication should be covered 
by the First Amendment. 
Now, for a chain of robot communications not ultimately addressed 
and received by a human being but instead initiated by one, Professors 
Skover and Collins argue that the robots act as proxies for that human 
being, and so long as that person’s acts are for a lawful purpose, the chain 
of robot communications warrants the same First Amendment coverage as 
would that person’s—that human being’s—communications. 
In making this argument, they claim that they are making explicit the 
principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., a 
2011 case.5 Having concluded by considering those forms of robot 
communication, that the First Amendment should cover robot 
communications generally, Professors Skover and Collins ask: what is the 
free speech protection that might be accorded to robotic expression?6 Now 
that we know the First Amendment applies to robotic speech, they ask, 
how much protection is robotic speech actually due? 
While they do not offer a final answer to this question, they suggest 
that the protection should be significant and begin the important work of 
developing a framework for a full answer. Rather than developing yet 
another message-centric, normative model of free speech protection that 
attempts to distinguish speech that is worthy of protection from speech 
that is not—and thereby ends up justifying the censorship of speech as 
much as its protection—Professors Skover and Collins adopt a medium-
centric approach to First Amendment protection. They focus on robotic 
communication as a new, disruptive technology and medium of 
communication, the utility of which is so great that its robust protection is 
inevitable. They offer two reasons for this conclusion. 
First, they argue that the tremendous utility of robotic 
communications alters the cost-benefit analysis traditionally applied in the 
First Amendment context and that the value added by robotic 
communication—in online shopping, booking travel, searching for goods, 
information, and titillating content, as well as myriad other internet 
services employing robots—is sufficiently great to cause us to tolerate 
harms such as defamation, invasion of privacy, and pornography that, in 
the past, we have used to justify curtailing the protection of non-robotic 
speech. 
                                                     
 5. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 6. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1. 
1078 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1075 
Second, they point out that the nature of the medium itself 
undermines the efficacy of prior restraints no matter how those prior 
restraints are justified, thus resulting in de facto nullification of any legal 
command to restrain robotic speech. As a result, rather than robotic speech 
being forced to conform to the existing norms of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, they argue in good, realist fashion that those legal norms 
will be forced to accommodate the functional realities of robotic speech. 
Those are their arguments as to why robotic communication should 
be covered by the First Amendment on one hand and why it will receive 
robust protection on the other. So, having summarized the argument of the 
first half of the book, we turn now to our panel and we will hear first from 
Attorney Bruce Johnson. Take it away. 
Johnson: My response to this argument was headlined “An Old 
Libel Lawyer Confronts Robotica’s Brave New World.” I’m an old libel 
lawyer. I’ve been practicing now for more than forty years, and I thought 
what I was reading was kind of unusual from my perspective. I’ll explain 
why. And also unusual, I think, from a First Amendment perspective. So, 
I took issue. 
The first point, and I guess these are the three large points, I want to 
stress. The first point is while David and Ron focus on intention-less free 
speech, in fact, in the law—and particularly the First Amendment law—
intentions matter for both good and for ill. And I’ll explain that this 
actually goes all the way back to probably 1789 in the United States 
Constitution drafting and extends as recently as New York Times v. 
Sullivan,7 Westboro Baptist Church,8 cases like that. And the First 
Amendment protections really do depend on good intentions versus bad 
intentions. Related to that, the law has warriors out there looking for 
liability, looking for cases, looking for payoffs. And as a consequence, 
they will be looking for the bad intentions. You can’t divorce robotic 
speech from the possibility that lawyers will be out there looking for a 
payday and trying to find bad actors, and the bad actors will be trying to 
insist that there is no payday because they are good actors. So, we are 
going to live in a world with a lot of intentions, and that’s a world which 
is very unusual for robots, obviously. It’s a human-centered world. 
So, first of all, intentions matter. And that means I’m taking issue 
with Ron and David’s utilitarianism. I don’t think utilitarianism is 
something that is going to pass muster in a courtroom effectively because 
it is basically a much larger concept: trying to weigh good speech versus 
bad speech. In fact, the law basically creates a different kind of calculus, 
similar to what we see in New York Times v. Sullivan, which is what kind 
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of intentions are behind this speech. Is it a lie or is it not a lie? Is it 
something where we want to encourage it or is it something we want to 
discourage? 
Number two: Ron and David’s book doesn’t really deal with a 
concept called “public concern speech.” In my libel work, I can tell you 
that the difference between speech on a matter of public concern and 
speech which is not on a matter of public concern is basically the 
difference between night and day. Public concern speech gives rise to a 
series of rules that are inherent, obviously in the defamation context, but 
we also saw it in the Jerry Falwell case9 in the U.S. Supreme Court that 
even if you recast your torts as some kind of intentional interference claim, 
New York Times v. Sullivan will still apply.10 
We saw it in the Westboro Baptist Church case, Snyder v. Phelps, 
several years ago in the U.S. Supreme Court.11 An intentional infliction of 
pain on people, basically on the families of soldiers who were being 
buried, by this anti-gay church. I don’t want to call it a church, more of a 
cult.12 And the Court basically said, yes, we’re going to allow that speech 
to basically be permitted,13 in part, because it’s speech on a matter of 
public concern.14 We fought it briefly there in that case where we argued 
that the Westboro Baptist Church was like Elmer Gantry15—they have a 
right to basically go out and make fools of themselves—but that speech on 
what they considered to be religious was something that the Court and a 
jury should not touch. 
So, that public concern aspect is something which is, by definition or 
not, not addressed by David and Ron, and I think it’s a key ingredient in 
distinguishing speech for which liability can attach and speech for which 
liability does not attach. The conversant situation where there is no public 
concern is what I call the Dun & Bradstreet case,16 from about thirty years 
ago. This was a credit report and it went to the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
the question was whether a libel claim would lie under basically New York 
Times v. Sullivan principles. And the U.S. Supreme Court said this is 
nothing that involves a matter of public concern; therefore, we are not 
going to touch it at all.17 And basically, it left the liability claim governed 
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by English common law,18 which, if you know anything about English 
common law, libel at that time was basically strict liability. And therefore, 
no First Amendment claim would attach. 
So, I think it’s important to distinguish between public interest 
speech and non-public interest speech, and at least the dialectic as I hear it 
from Ron and David doesn’t. I think that’s an important consideration. 
The third thing: it’s really hard to deal with robotic speech without 
dealing with articles that appear. For example, this one, two days ago, in 
The Washington Post: “Russia Used Mainstream Media to Manipulate 
American Voters.”19 This was two days ago in The Washington Post. Of 
course, yesterday, February 16th, we saw the indictments issued by the 
Mueller investigation dealing with the Russian attempts to use robotic 
speech to affect the American political system with toxic views to 
influence the course of the 2016 election. I don’t think you can separate 
robotic speech from the problems we saw in 2016. As a practical matter, 
the politicians will be dealing with that in one form or another for years to 
come. 
It’s interesting to me, when I grew up, I remember the inability to get 
information directly from foreign countries. I actually remember one day 
we were staying in Kalaloch on the beach on the Olympic coast, which got 
no telephone reception, no radio reception at all. So, I brought a shortwave 
radio with me—this was in 1991—because I could get Radio Moscow, and 
they had great music on Radio Moscow. This was August 1991. I can 
remember it very clearly. I was hearing this really odd music. It was the 
kind of music you heard when they were deposing Khrushchev and 
deposing Brezhnev, or at least moving Brezhnev out. It was almost 
funereal, and I said there has been a change of government in Moscow. 
And everybody looked at me silly. You know, we’re on the Olympic coast 
beach. So, I went to Voice of America. Nothing. I went to BBC. Nothing. 
I was the only person in the United States who actually knew that there 
had been a coup in the Soviet Union, against Gorbachev. That’s how 
unusual it was for international speech to be able to connect directly from 
something in Moscow and receive news directly from the Russians. 
Today, on the internet, as we saw yesterday and with yesterday’s 
indictments from the Mueller investigation, we are now getting this stuff 
pushing directly into the political bloodstream of America—directly from 
the troll factory in St. Petersburg. And I don’t think the American political 
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system has yet figured out how to deal with this—much less the American 
legal system—when and if somebody can be found to be blamed. So, I just 
want to highlight that, when you talk about robotic speech, we are going 
to have to talk about the 2016 election eventually. 
So, anyway, the first point I took issue with was the strict utilitarian 
calculus. You can go back all the way to the initial arguments by 
Alexander Hamilton in the Croswell case in 1803.20 Basically, defending 
a Federalist editor from a Jeffersonian prosecution, Hamilton basically 
argued that there should be protections available for anybody’s right to 
publish “with impunity, truth with motives and for justifiable ends.”21 
That’s what Alexander Hamilton argued to the New York Court of 
Appeals in the Harry Croswell case.22 He lost.23 Actually, there was a 
three-to-three tie and, therefore, the lower court judgment was affirmed.24 
But with his death a year later, this statute became embodied in virtually 
every state constitution or every state law allowing that there should be 
protections available for people with good motives. In other words, we’ve 
been basically working since at least 1803 against the strict liability system 
that I think is inherent of the utilitarian calculus that David and Ron have 
argued about. 
And that persists today, in the Schenck25 case where we developed 
the “clear and present danger test,” the Brandenburg26 case in 1960 when 
we developed the notion that certain types of intention should not 
necessarily lead to liability for attempts to overthrow the government. 
Basically, that was an Ohio law that had a strict liability for advocacy of 
violence. To Justice Brennan’s endorsement in New York Times v. 
Sullivan27 of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open protections and the actual 
malice rule in favor of public interest speech, basically, for good or for ill, 
we have intentions built into our law dramatically, and even with the 
onrush of robotic speech, I don’t expect that we’re going to be able to get 
rid of that in favor of intention-less free speech. 
The other thing to bear in mind is, I think, there’s going to be this 
notion that abuse is inherent in what will be found liable under our legal 
system. That is simply the way the American legal system works. And it’s 
going to be unusual to figure out how our system will deal with it. My 
view is that we’re going to have a very robust protection for computer 
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speech, which is not public interest-oriented. A few months ago, a joke 
circulated about Jeff Bezos: “Alexa, get me something on Whole Foods.” 
And the response: “Buying Whole Foods.” It would be interesting to 
imagine Jeff Bezos sort of made that comment one day and then bingo. 
Anyway, non-public interest speech will be absolutely protected. It will be 
basically an area where people will be very comfortable. The law will very 
easily regulate that type of speech. But in matters of public interest, in 
matters of public concern, the First Amendment doctrine is much more 
stringent and would likely block any such regulation. 
For example, the bots that influenced our election in 2016. A series 
of “disinformation bots,” they are called, I think you are going to see a 
difficulty in the ability to regulate falsity that deals with public matters. 
There are a number of cases that have already come through the court 
system. The most recent one, which is cited in my materials in their book, 
is the Susan B. Anthony case, Susan B. Anthony v. Kim, a Sixth Circuit 
case where the state of Ohio sought to regulate false campaign speech and 
the court in the Sixth Circuit said, you can’t. You simply have no ability 
to regulate false campaign speech.28 
We have a similar holding here in the state of Washington dealing 
with our public disclosure commission. So, in fact, the further along you 
go on the continuum of public interest, the higher you are in terms of 
public interest speech and the less likely it will be that government can 
influence it. Therefore, we will have what I wrote in the materials: a 
tsunami of botnet speech in all of our election campaigns to come without 
any serious ability to regulate it. And, as I concluded, I said, “This will not 
be Mr. Rogers’s neighborhood anymore. And in fact, in American 
campaign speech the death of discourse is clearly upon us.” In other words, 
we’re a dystopian view. Thank you. 
Silverman: Thank you very much, Attorney Johnson. And now we 
have Professor Norton. 
Norton: Good morning and thanks so much for sharing your 
morning with us. And thanks to Law Review for inviting me. I appreciate 
the graciousness of Maia, Brendan, and Mylla. I actually grew up in Seattle 
and I don’t get back very often. So, I appreciate the chance to come back 
even for a day, a day like today. It brings back fond memories of a very 
happy childhood. So, thanks for that. 
I’m not a technologist. I’m a constitutional lawyer, scholar, and 
teacher. I know very little about technology, and I’m often uncomfortable 
with it. But I’ve been interested in studying, along with my co-authors, if 
you take a look at artificial intelligence or robotic speech, whatever you 
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want to call it, what that tells us about free speech law and doctrine. In 
other words, we get the hard problem of new and unusual speakers. What 
does that tell us about why we protect speech or why we shouldn’t protect 
speech? 
So, in earlier work, first with my co-author Toni Massaro from the 
University of Arizona29 and then a follow-up piece with Toni and my 
current colleague Margot Kaminski, we concluded, similarly to Ron and 
David, that very little in the First Amendment law poses a barrier to the 
coverage of robotic speech.30 And this conclusion feels counterintuitive to 
many, but it has much more to do with the contemporary state of free 
speech law doctrine than with the nature of robots or the nature of 
technology. 
So, for example, if you think about the positive free speech theories 
underlying the First Amendment arguments for why we affirmatively 
should protect speech, why is speech in the Constitution? Positive theories 
say, well, it’s because speech provides us with good things. And the 
positive theories, for the most part, focus on protecting expression because 
it is thought to give listeners affirmative benefits in terms of facilitating a 
democratic self-governance—affirmative benefits in terms of exposure to 
new ideas and knowledge. This is the marketplace of ideas argument. And 
affirmative benefits in terms of informing listeners’ own choices in their 
own time. 
And we also looked at negative free speech theory, which is the idea 
that we don’t protect speech because it’s all that great; we protect speech 
because the government is so darn scary. So, this argument here is an 
argument that we protect speech to protect listeners from the government. 
And here too, we can understand that contemporary free speech law and 
doctrine, whether it takes a positive or negative focus, is primarily 
interested in what this means for listeners. Are they getting the positive 
benefits they deserve? Are they being protected from the dangers of 
government? 
So, we concluded that free speech law and theory protects listeners’ 
interests and free speech outputs rather than speakers’ humanness or 
humanity in ways that make it very difficult to place robots or artificial 
intelligence speakers beyond the First Amendment speech. Ron and David 
have reached similar conclusions in their terrific book, Robotica.31 One 
measure of a quality book is that you find yourself thinking about it long 
after you have read it, and that is true for me. I read their manuscript early 
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last summer, and I still think about it. So, thank you for that. And they too 
conclude, as both a descriptive matter and a normative matter, that we 
protect speech because of its affirmative value to listeners, and they define 
that value very broadly as listeners’ utility. Speech is valuable to listeners. 
It is of utility to listeners when it makes our lives easier or more 
pleasurable, more entertaining, and more possible. 
So far, I’m in complete agreement with David and Ron that the First 
Amendment, at least today, is largely, if not entirely, about serving 
listeners’ interests in speech. It’s listeners all the way down. So, what I 
might talk about for the next few minutes is ask you, what does a listener-
centered approach to robotic speech mean? And I’m going to very briefly 
discuss the complicated and sometimes even dark side of robotic speech 
from a listener-centered perspective, if we take listeners seriously. 
A number of the folks who have spoken already have used the word 
disruption or disruptive, and I like that very much. I think the Dean talked 
about how some of these changes in technology are going to be disrupting 
industry. I certainly agree. I feel—and I think David does too—that the 
changes in technology that we’re seeing are going to disrupt also First 
Amendment doctrine. I don’t know how, but I think it is inevitable. And 
actually, Bruce gave you some examples of why this is the case, and I will 
continue on those. I am not going to solve the problem of how First 
Amendment doctrine should respond to these challenges. I’m going to 
worry about it and I’m going to complain about it a little bit, and I’m going 
to ask David hopefully to solve it. He’s an expert. But I just want to 
introduce the concept here. 
Now, cheap and plentiful speech is often of great utility to listeners. 
The more speech the better for listeners, usually—not always, but usually. 
Robotic speech is one of many examples of a source of cheap and plentiful 
speech. So, from one point of view, robotic speech and other cheap and 
plentiful speech is the ultimate in listener utility. But there is a dark side, 
as cheap and plentiful speech can pose new dangers either to some 
individual listeners or to the collective public. I will cite some recent 
thoughtful commentaries on this. 
Rick Hasen, for example, tells us that cheap speech has dramatically 
lowered costs for those who want to draw upon people’s fears and rile 
them up for violent purposes.32 Tim Wu says that it is no longer speech 
itself that is scarce, but the attention of listeners. Emerging threats to 
public discourse take advantage of this change. The low costs of speaking 
have made it easier to weaponize speech as a tool of speech control. The 
unfortunate truth is that cheap speech may be used to attack, harass, and 
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silence as much as it is used to illuminate or debate.33 Mark Verstraete and 
Derek Bambauer use a more flattering term than cheap speech.34 They call 
this democratization of the information system. Then they go on to say 
that this transformation is not at all and in any way good. Facebook’s goal 
is not the production of truth but rather the generation of increased traffic 
interaction by users. Falsity can be profitable if it is popular, and falsity is 
often popular. The new architecture of network information has a 
structurally corrosive effect. It is easier to generate doubt about narratives, 
even those produced by previously tested sources, than it is to create 
trusted content. Authors and distributors attract attention, which they 
monetize by casting doubt. 
And then finally, Julie Cohen uses the term “infoglut” to describe 
this same dynamic: this era of cheap and plentiful speech fueled by robots 
and other technology. She says, “Information abundance also enables new 
types of power asymmetries that revolve around differential access to data 
and to the ability to capture, store, and process it on a massive scale.”35 
Different terms—cheap speech, the abundance of speech, the 
democratization of information, infoglut—they are all describing 
abundant speech of the sort that robots and other technological 
developments make possible. And sometimes it is great for listeners, but 
that is not always the case. I want to give you a few other examples. 
Sometimes, powerful speakers weaponize cheap speech to threaten 
listeners—for example, by exploiting their information and their power 
advantages and thus increasing the likelihood and severity of the harms 
that they can inflict on listeners. What do I mean by harms? Well, I’m 
thinking in particular the harms of deception, manipulation, and coercion. 
And powerful speakers’ motives for exploiting their listeners are many and 
are complicated. Certainly, they include financial gain, political gain. 
Sometimes they do it for their own self entertainment, sometimes because 
they are interested in undermining the notion of truth itself in order to 
undermine democratic institution as well. 
I too, like Bruce, am worried about the recent problem of Russian bot 
trolling, and I think it exemplifies the challenges, the dark side, of robotic 
speech. As Nathaniel Persily says, 
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Bots can serve many purposes, some beneficent and others 
nefarious . . . . Of greatest relevance here, bots can spread 
information or misinformation, and can cause topics to “trend” online 
through the automated promotion of hashtags, stories, and the like. 
During the 2016 campaign, the prevalence of bots in spreading 
propaganda and fake news appears to have reached new heights.36 
Tim Wu points to China as another example of a powerful speaker 
taking advantage of the cheap and abundant speech made possible by 
robots and other technology to threaten listeners’ interests, and there he 
describes what China has in place. The Chinese government has in place 
a regime less intent on stamping out forbidden content, but it is instead 
focused on distraction, cheerleading, and preventing meaningful collective 
action. This is another example of what Julie Cohen called infoglut: we 
will disempower listeners by flooding them with information. So, speakers 
are a threat to listeners. 
Second, sometimes listeners themselves use cheap and abundant 
speech of the sort that robots make possible to threaten other listeners’ 
utility. And again, I agree with David and Ron that listeners are the focus 
of most contemporary free speech law and doctrine, but listeners of course 
themselves are neither monolithic nor homogenous. So, listeners’ interests 
themselves, both short- and long-term, are often in conflict. Think of 
trolling, for example. Whitney Phillips explains that trolls take perverse 
joy in ruining a complete stranger’s day.37 They will do and say absolutely 
anything to accomplish this objective and, in the service of these nefarious 
ends, deliberately target the most vulnerable—or, as the trolls would say, 
exploitable targets. So, the trolls’ listeners include their targets, the targets 
of the troll. And certainly the targets of the troll don’t find that speech to 
be of utility enough and find it to be of great harm. But some of the trolls’ 
listeners include other members of the trolling community who derive 
pleasure and excitement—and again, I’m using her terms—watching 
others ruin a complete stranger’s day. In other words, these listeners find 
trolling to be enjoyable, of utility precisely because others find it so 
unpleasant. They find it enjoyable to watch and listen to that happen. 
Relatedly, different listeners experience hate speech in different 
ways and disagree about its utility. Again, anonymous hate speech is of no 
utility to the targets of hate speech, but many bystanders enjoy it under our 
capacious understanding of utility. In returning to our earlier discussion of 
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how some speakers exploit cheap speech to undermine democratic 
institutions, again, some listeners enjoy such speech when it speaks to and 
confirms their own preferences, their own intuitions, their own fears, their 
own skepticisms. Lots of us like to listen to and read what’s outrageous, 
and lots of us like to listen to and read stuff that confirms rather than 
challenges our preexisting intuitions. So, in other words, the utility of this 
sort of cheap and abundant speech made possible by robots and other 
technology is contestable. The utility of speakers and listeners may be in 
tension, and listeners themselves may disagree about the utility of 
contested speech. There are winners and losers here. 
So far, I have been characterizing this as the dark side of listener 
utility in the context of robotic speech, but I’m going to try to turn to a 
more affirmative or positive frame. And I just want to spend a minute or 
two on what it would mean to protect and, thus, take listeners’ interests 
seriously in the context of robotic and other technologically cheap speech. 
And I think that a truly listener-centered approach, if it is listeners all the 
way down, sometimes supports the regulation as well as the protection of 
speech to protect listeners’ interests. And we have some precedent for this 
in the context of commercial speech, professional speech, and maybe 
employer speech. 
The First Amendment is sometimes interpreted to commit 
government to regulate that speech to serve listeners’ First Amendment 
interest. And doctrinal adjustments in those other contexts include, for 
example, requiring some speakers—like commercial speakers—not to lie, 
requiring some speakers—even in the campaign context—to verbally 
disclose their source because listeners find that knowing the source or the 
origin of speech is so helpful to them in trying to figure out the quality or 
credibility of that speech. In other words, in some other contexts that we 
might understand as listener-centered contexts, the courts have said: if we 
have to choose between speakers and listeners in this context, we choose 
listeners. Why? Maybe because speakers are exploiting information or 
power dynamics, but the doctrinal move there in that context sometimes is 
that government imposes duties of honesty, imposes duties of accuracy, 
and imposes duties of disclosure on comparatively powerful and 
knowledgeable speakers in order to protect listeners. 
So, in the same way, we might conclude that government should be 
allowed under the First Amendment to regulate robotic speech, sometimes 
on the basis of content to privilege human listeners’ interests and informed 
choices or in avoiding certain harms, like the harms of coercion, deception, 
and discrimination. In other words, free speech protection for robotic 
speakers does not rob the First Amendment of the human focus so long as 
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our understanding of the First Amendment attends to both the value and 
danger of robotic speech. 
Now, how to actually do that as a doctrinal matter is the hard 
question. It’s just the disruption question that I stated earlier. It’s one that 
we’re going to be grappling with for years to come. And for sure, 
sometimes the answer may not be legal regulation. Right? Sometimes we 
may prefer market, norms, or architecture as a better approach to 
protecting listeners’ interests. 
To close with one specific doctrinal possibility: I suggest that First 
Amendment law absolutely positively could and probably should support 
regulation that requires the disclosure of the source of speech as robotic if 
it is in fact robotic. Again, the source or origin of speech is extremely 
valuable information to listeners. Listeners rely on the source of speech as 
a heuristic, as a proxy for expression’s quality and credibility. It’s true, 
sometimes speakers prefer to be anonymous, sometimes anonymity is in 
speakers’ interest for all sorts of reasons. On occasion, we might find those 
reasons compelling, for example, when the speaker is a whistle-blower and 
is otherwise vulnerable to coercion. But for the most part, speakers who 
seek to hide their true identity from listeners are doing so because they are 
trying to exploit or manipulate listeners. 
So, disclosing and requiring the disclosure of the origin of the speech 
I think is appropriate if you truly do take a listener-centered approach to 
the First Amendment. In fact, precisely for that reason, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly upheld government regulations that require disclosures in a 
campaign speech context. They require disclosure of the source of certain 
campaign contributions or communications. Why? Because that 
information is so important to listeners. And they uphold those disclosures 
in a context—the campaign speech context—where, of course, otherwise 
they are very loath to permit government regulation. 
So, I acknowledge that identifying the threats that robotic speech 
may impose to listeners’ interests is much easier than resolving or 
responding to those threats in a satisfactory way. And my point is simply 
that celebrating listener utility—and there is plenty to celebrate and I very 
much appreciate David and Ron’s contribution to that—but my point is 
that celebrating has a dark side of its own and it creates some problems 
even while it solves others. 
Silverman: Great. David, your responses now. 
Skover: First, I am deeply indebted to my colleagues and friends 
Bruce Johnson and Helen Norton, first for their participation as 
commentators in my book co-authored with Ron Collins called Robotica: 
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Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence.38 Their challenging and very 
astute commentaries were published in the second half of the work, along 
with the fine introductory piece for the book authored by your keynoter 
today, Ryan Calo.39 Those commentaries deserve to be read in full. I hope 
that you will do so when Robotica finally appears in print in May or June 
of this year. And this will be my last commercial advertising ploy for the 
day. 
I also am grateful to them for agreeing to discourse with me today as 
panelists, thus foreshadowing for you some of the most salient points of 
contention that they take in their soon-to-be-published commentaries. 
Finally, my thanks to Greg Silverman, my colleague at the law school for 
agreeing to read Robotica, in manuscript form no less, and to moderate 
this panel today. 
To begin, I remind you all that a robust exchange of ideas is one of 
the most revered aspirations for the First Amendment. And in that spirit, I 
am very fortunate to have the informed engagement of such thoughtful 
individuals as Ryan, Bruce, and Helen. Of course, on some points I differ 
from my colleagues. But hearty intellectual rough-and-tumble is not only 
true to free speech principles, but it also expands the borders of our 
thinking. And it can be just darn fun. 
Before directly addressing Bruce and Helen’s arguments, there are a 
few important matters which I call tenets that I wish to mention so as to 
clarify your understanding of Robotica’s larger purposes and themes and 
to set their critiques in perspective. 
Tenet I: On Technology and Theory. Robotica does not offer a new 
and generalized theory of free speech.40 The principal aim of the book is 
to address the relationship between robotic technologies and the First 
Amendment, and to demonstrate how robotic expression stands to 
reconfigure free speech theory.41 Accordingly, Part One of the book 
delivers, in Ryan Calo’s words, “an historical tour of communications, 
technologies, the transition from oral to written language, the invention of 
a printing press, and the arrival of the electronic communications finally 
arriving at the age of robotics.”42 
In all of this, Ron and I highlighted several takeaway points—some 
of which Greg mentioned, but all of which merit reinforcement: 
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 No communication technology is likely to overtake its 
predecessor unless its utility, however defined, is great. Thus, for 
example, printed books, including the Gutenberg Bible, eclipse 
scripted documents because of their greater cost effectiveness 
and their functionality. 
 When utility is great, a new communications technology 
promotes values that may well override the values of its 
predecessor, including political and moral ones. To continue my 
religious example, the printing press enabled the Protestant 
Reformation, challenging the religious stranglehold of the 
Catholic Church in Western Europe. 
 Governmental censorship is likely to push back against new 
communications technologies in the interest of preserving old 
values. Thus, the Catholic Church censored heretical books, 
controlled printing presses, and persecuted heretics. 
 When its utility is substantial, a new communications technology 
can override censorial efforts. Thus, despite the Church’s Index 
of Forbidden Books and its Inquisition, the religious and 
nonreligious book industry grew and thrived. 
 And in all of this, the link between the mode of communication 
and its utility is the driving force for free speech protection, 
either legally or functionally. Accordingly, the First Amendment 
explicitly forbids religious establishments, protects the freedom 
of religious thought and practices, and safeguards the press. 
So, you see, the main purpose of this book, again, is not to deliver a 
new general theory of the First Amendment, but to explore the connection 
between robotic technologies and technologies of the past and censorial 
governmental efforts.43 
Tenet II: The Coverage versus Protection Distinction. Central to 
Robotica is a distinction, which Greg did mention, between those speech 
activities that might be covered by the First Amendment as distinguished 
from those that are to be protected by the First Amendment.44 
In Part Two of the book, Ron and I present a theory of when a claim 
of First Amendment coverage can be made, which we call “intention-less 
free speech” (IFS).45 We argue that when a reasonable receiver 
understands a transmission of information to be a meaningful expression, 
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then First Amendment coverage exists. In other words, unless the receiver 
finds some expression meaningful, the transmission will not be deemed 
speech at all. Only if a robotic transmission satisfies the IFS standard will 
First Amendment protection analysis come into play. 
Part Three of the book then proposes that protection may be 
determined by a contextualized evaluation of the utility secured and 
disutility or harm incurred by the robotic expression in question.46 At that 
point, the norm of utility operates as a justification for First Amendment 
protection. Whether utilities are offset by governmental demonstrations of 
harm will ultimately determine whether the robotic expression is given 
First Amendment protection. Speech will not eat the world under a maxim 
of utility because speech is not to be determined by utility but rather by 
IFS, the intention-less free speech standard. And protected speech is not 
to be determined by utility alone but rather by evaluation of competing 
utilities and harms. 
Tenet III: On Utility—A Conceptual Framework for Protecting 
Robotic Speech. In order to clear away some analytical brush, it may be 
useful to stress what our utility norm is not. 
It is not exclusionary. Our utility norm can work in tandem with other 
First Amendment normative values as long as they reinforce one another. 
This is, in a sense, a partial response to Bruce, who is concerned about our 
norm of utility and our standard of intention-less free speech as ignoring 
intentions. Other norms that safeguard intentions can still operate in 
tandem with utility. We would say the likelihood is that utility will take 
over when those other norms conflict with it. 
Our utility norm is not hypocritical. It aims to avoid the hypocrisy of 
many writers in the First Amendment arena who stretch Enlightenment 
theories—everything from the search for truth to self-governance—almost 
to the breaking point in order to protect outlier forms of expression, 
including robotic expression. 
Our norm of utility is not synonymous with other First Amendment 
principles. It should not be understood to collapse into other normative 
value theories. A robotic expression that serves even private interests, as 
contrasted with public ones, might be protected in the absence of any 
significant competing harms. 
Bruce seems to be somewhat unmindful of this point when he 
critiques Ron and me for failure to address the bedrock principle providing 
First Amendment heightened protection to speech relating to matters of 
public concern. I offer several responses. First, public concern is not an 
inquiry that is relevant to First Amendment coverage for robotic 
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expression under our IFS theory. It only becomes relevant under our utility 
calculus for First Amendment protection. The more robotic expression is 
useful for the general public, the more protectable it may be; or the more 
the public interest is harmed, the less protectable it might be. 
Second, notions of public interest might already be subsumed within 
the utility calculus. This resonates with my earlier observation that the 
utility norm is not exclusionary but may work in tandem with other First 
Amendment normative values. 
Third, public interest is sometimes defined vis-à-vis other First 
Amendment norms, such as Alexander Meiklejohn’s theory of self-
governance. The Supreme Court suggested as much in Garrison v. 
Louisiana when it equated speech concerning public affairs with “the 
essence of self-governance.”47 To the extent this occurs, public interest 
analysis may dilute the utility norm and thereby diminish First 
Amendment protection. 
Fourth, as Bruce explicitly concedes in his written commentary 
(though he did not mention it today), public interest is an unruly norm 
inviting confusion.48 Indeed, some of Professor Norton’s line-drawing 
concerns would be equally applicable to the public interest analysis that 
Bruce touts. 
Fifth, given the aegis of the First Amendment, the public interest in 
robotic communication technologies may well be defined primarily as the 
maximization of the free flow of digitized information, ideas, and 
opinions. 
Sixth, insofar as our utility norm may invite the Huxleyan dystopia 
that Bruce suggests, the same could be said of existing First Amendment 
doctrines. That was a larger message of Ron’s and my first book together, 
The Death of Discourse.49 Apparently, Bruce forgot that we first coined 
that term. And though I am largely sympathetic to Bruce’s fears of political 
and cultural pollution, a governmental cure to such a problem can itself be 
viewed as a form of Orwellian tyranny. 
Finally, the utility norm is not canonical. Like all other theories, the 
utility norm must have some play in the joints in order to be effective. 
Because of that play, there will necessarily be hard questions of line 
drawing. Moreover, Robotica offers only a few pages to considerations of 
First Amendment protection, furnishing only a preliminary setting of 
generalized principles for analysis rather than a treatise-like framework for 
deciding specific issues of protection.50 Even though she is truly mindful 
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of this point, Helen is nonetheless troubled by the hard line-drawing 
problems that “the dark side” of utility imposes. It bears emphasizing, 
however, that there are some meaningful limitations built into the robotic 
free speech proposal. In addition to the intention-less free speech threshold 
that I earlier described for coverage, there is the harm principle. In other 
words, evaluation of one person’s utility and another person’s disutility 
and harms are all part of the calculus of First Amendment protection. And 
the precise point at which the line is drawn is often far too contextualized 
to be determined a priori. 
Of course, the idea of rights in conflict is nothing new to the First 
Amendment. Indeed, it is commonplace; but not all rights or interests are 
created equal. Put into our context, one person’s utilities may be more 
functional and less harmful to society than another person’s. And if so, the 
First Amendment utility norm supplemented by other doctrines such as 
content discrimination, vagueness, substantial overbreadth, etcetera, may 
point to enhanced protection. Given the nature of robotic expression, its 
mind-boggling speed, and its wide range and reach, some legal tests might 
need to be rethought. Brandenburg’s incitement standard, for example, 
might be reconfigured given the instantaneous speed and wide-ranging 
reach of robotic expression.51 The Brandenburg imminence test might be 
revised with much more emphasis on the “likely to produce action” prong. 
All of this may call for a technological fix rather than a regulatory one. 
Which leads me to my last tenet. 
Tenet IV: On Functional Fixes.52 First Amendment law typically 
disfavors regulatory responses when private sector technology can be 
fixed. In First Amendment law, this is called a less restrictive means. This 
occurs when technological fixes are both reasonably available and 
adequate. Such may be the case with robotic technologies that have the 
capacity to outstrip the pragmatic potential of regulatory responses. When 
Helen and Bruce bemoan, as they do in their written commentaries, a 
dissemination of fake news by robot trolls or bots, this tenet on 
technological fixes takes on enhanced force.53 
On the one hand, false statements or misinformation about private 
individuals or commercial products are already regulated by numerous 
federal and state consumer protection and defamation laws. On the other 
hand, the problem is much more complicated, as Bruce noted, when the 
fake news occurs in the public arena. If nefarious groups deploy trolls or 
bots in order to spread misinformation there, it may be incumbent on 
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opposing groups to respond in technological kind and employ anti-trolls 
to correct the record with more truthful information. 
When Bruce decries the destruction of democratic discourse by 
robots that completely escape governmental control, Ron and I cry out for 
robotic fixes that trump the potential of regulatory responses alone.54 
As one of the authors of The Death of Discourse, I greatly 
sympathize with Bruce’s angst over the electronic pollution of enlightened 
and rational political discourse.55 Our cultural critique in The Death of 
Discourse notwithstanding, as a legal matter, we nod to arguments against 
governmental monitoring of bot-generated political falsehoods.56 Of 
course, falsehoods have been long purveyed by human agents of political 
campaigns using earlier technologies. Only consider William Randolph 
Hearst’s notorious manipulation of print news in order to fuel public fury 
and fervor for the Spanish–American War of 1898. Radio and television 
ushered in an era of even more widespread political misinformation than 
the printing press ever provided. Surely, the First Amendment would 
prevent the government from censoring false political speech on those 
technologies. That should arguably be so regardless of the technology. 
Notably, the technological fix is an instantiation of Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s First Amendment maxim that the answer to false speech is not 
censorship but counter-speech. 
Even if entities spend huge amounts of time and money to influence 
and manufacture our preferences, as Helen lamented in her written 
commentary,57 should we admit to government regulation of political 
campaigns? Could this not be a stark example of governmental 
paternalism run amok? Ours is a First Amendment that abhors a 
governmental Ministry of Truth. 
Evolution does not respect constitutions, customs, or creeds. It 
washes over them like waves erode shorelines. What does that mean to us? 
It means that we must approach robotic communication with a certain 
open-mindedness, a preparedness to question our presuppositions and a 
willingness to embrace, although guardedly, what seems inevitable. The 
inevitable may not always synchronize well with today’s view of the law, 
or even with today’s societal values associated with what it means to be 
human and engage in communication. But in the end, it is well to recall 
the sage advice of Francois-Marie Arouet Voltaire: Doubt is not a pleasant 
condition, but certainty is an absurd one. 
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Once again, I thank my fellow panelists for their thorny and stirring 
challenges to Robotica.58 Ron’s and my book is far better for their 
critiques, and the same can surely be said of the discourse we’ve heard 
today. 
Silverman: Great. Thank you, David. So, now we have about fifteen 
minutes for questions and answers. That means you, the audience, get to 
pepper our panel with any questions you might have. And of course, we 
can ask questions of one another as well. But I know we are running a little 
long and so I want to jump right into Q&A with the audience. State your 
name if you will. 
Amanda: Hi, my name is Amanda. Thanks so much. I can try to 
summarize the question. My background is working in data visualization 
and big data, and for the past five years, I have been working to sell things 
at Wal-Mart and have viewed that world. And so, when we talk about 
intentionality, it’s really towards everyone, but I see this more when this 
is leveraged to your example, “Alexa, buy something from Whole Foods.” 
I don’t see it as just person-to-person, robot-to-person; this comes from 
somewhere. It’s coming from a human somewhere. It’s Google, it’s 
Facebook. And at the very least, even if we are not extremely skeptical—
I happen to be very skeptical, but even if we’re not—we want to sell 
products, services. Do any of you have a comment about that? About the 
way that the intentionality is to push something, to sell or at least to keep 
us online, to keep us on Facebook. Just, again, if you have some thoughts 
on that. It’s an enormously broad question. 
Johnson: I actually co-authored a treatise on commercial speech that 
basically takes issue with the notion that commercial intentions are 
suspect.59 I actually think commercial speech is probably among the safest 
speech around because you are going to find out pretty early on whether 
you have a bad product or not. That doesn’t happen in the political world, 
unfortunately. It may take a year, two years, three years, or four years, but 
you may have disastrous results in the meantime. So, in a sense, I don’t 
distrust the notion that somebody wants to sell me something. On the other 
hand, you are right: big data is a danger. There are forces that are very 
powerful in terms of pushing technology on us. The social media situation 
is, to my mind, fraught with all sorts of risk about how much access we 
have to it versus how much access is being manipulated by other forces 
than us. So, I see a risk there. On the other hand, if you grew up in a world 
of four broadcast networks, or three broadcast networks, this is very 
familiar to us. This is a much more limited space of large speakers 
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controlling the way we communicate. Broadcast’s role in 1960 was not 
that different from what we’re dealing with in terms of the technology 
world in 2018. 
Amanda: I guess not just a question of service and product, the fact 
that they know every single thing about me. I work at Target; they 
advertise it. They know your age, your income, your political views, and 
the way they swing that it is more than that. Are there concerns around it? 
That’s more it. 
Skover: I think we’re going to see that with the Mueller investigation 
because if there were actually efforts to communicate between the 
Russians and the Trump campaign or Cambridge Analytica in terms of 
whom to target with the misinformation, we will be seeing some very 
significant discussions about that point. Let me just address your question 
from another angle, and that is from the perspective of First Amendment 
protection. When in Virginia Pharmacy in 1976 the Supreme Court first 
gave serious First Amendment protection to commercial speech,60 it did 
so in a way that Ron’s and my book called a vindication of the intention-
less free speech coverage theory.61 It did so by saying that the important 
value in the commercial communication is not the intentions of the 
speaker. The Court assumed that every corporate speaker intended to sell 
a product, but it said that what was important was the listeners, i.e., the 
consumers—that is, what they received as information and how it might 
affect their decisions to purchase in the marketplace. 
So, from a First Amendment standpoint, your concerns have been 
rendered almost irrelevant—not entirely irrelevant—but that is not the 
focus of First Amendment protection. First Amendment protection is 
based on a reception theory or the reader response theory that Ron and I 
relied on in our book. It is the meaning of the information to the consumer 
that the Court valued for granting First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech. 
Howard: My name is Howard Chizeck. I’m going to push on 
Amanda’s question a little bit more. Right now, should companies 
involved with Alexa or Siri, possibly Cortana, learn things about you from 
the discourse? For example, by watching your response and voice tone and 
stress patterns in response to comments and images, your sexual 
orientation can be determined with high accuracy, as can your political 
leanings as well as information that is available in databases about your 
network and your buying patterns. So, it seems that the discourse that is 
going on is not just to sell and to acquire information about you, which can 
                                                     
 60. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
760–73 (1976). 
 61. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1. 
2018] Robotic Speech and the First Amendment 1097 
then be sold to other companies. And that is not necessarily in the 
expectation of the user. And yet it is commercial free speech. So, I’m 
wondering how that fits in to your First Amendment analysis and other 
related privacy issues legally. 
Norton: Yeah, I’ll take that. Thank you both of you. I agree and share 
your concern. If you go back to the emergence of the contemporary 
commercial speech doctrine in the 1970s, it was transparently listener-
focused. Meaning commercial speech is not protected when it is false, 
misleading, or related to illegal activity. Why? Because listeners have no 
interest in commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to illegal 
activity. And all other commercial speech, regulation of all other 
commercial speech—truthful, non-misleading, non-illegal commercial 
speech—receives intermediate scrutiny. Basically, the idea is that the 
regulation should live or die based on whether or not the regulation serves 
listeners’ interest. That was the 1970s statement on commercial speech. 
And I think it’s very fair to wonder if that still describes how the 
commercial speech doctrine is working today. If you think about the 
Sorrell case, you think about some others, it seems like the Court today is 
very, very comfortable striking down regulations of commercial-related 
speech that were designed to protect listeners—for example, designed to 
protect listeners’ privacy—in the name of protecting speech. That really 
serves the commercial speakers’ interest. So, I think we started down the 
right path with commercial speech doctrine, but I’m uncomfortable with 
where we are currently. We have lost our focus on listeners’ interests. 
Johnson: I’ll just add one word. Helen is quite right: characterizing 
the change as the focus. But in the Sorrell case, the Supreme Court 
essentially equated commercial speech with all other forms of speech 
when it came to its content discrimination principle.62 That is the First 
Amendment, right? It does not allow the government to discriminate on 
the basis of content or viewpoint, at least without showing a serious 
harm.63 And so, in the Sorrell case there was no, there really wasn’t any 
evidence, any great evidence of harm involved with the sale of the 
information, which was pharmaceutical purchases by customers.64 And 
without a record of invariably provable harm, the content discrimination 
that was on the face of the regulation there was deemed unconstitutional.65 
Ruth: Hi, Ruth Atherton from the Gates Foundation. So, I’m very 
interested in—and I think this is directed to Helen and David—I’m 
interested in thinking about the Brandeis principle that more speech is the 
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solution. I’m interested in your thoughts about the use of the anti-troll 
measures—which, I love this concept—as a way to correct speech, but in 
light of the fact that cheap speech is such a lower threshold to produce than 
evidence-based data. Can you both comment on that? 
Skover: All right, I’ll take this first. Let me just point out that this 
problem is not entirely endemic to robotic technology. We have the 
problem you’re talking about with television—certainly since the age of 
cable. My mother never watched any other station than Fox News. She 
refused to watch any channel that did not confirm to her own biases—her 
own views of the world. So, these phenomena preexisted robotics. What’s 
important about the anti-troll or the anti-bot proposal is that it would be a 
technological fix, not something that the government arranged, but that 
some corporation might produce and purvey to those who want to hear the 
other side of the argument. But that assumes a certain openness of mind. 
That’s really the issue. In fact, part of the problem that Bruce is talking 
about—the death of discourse—occurs in large part because, in this 
information club that you talk about, many of us just simply cut out the 
noise and focus entirely on what confirms our views of the world. In such 
a scenario as that, we may not be getting the benefit of the anti-troll 
proposal. 
Norton: Yes, very quickly. I appreciate the question. I don’t know 
the solution. I think once we acknowledge that cheap speech has value and 
danger, in addressing the dangers, I am open to all solutions. I am open to 
legal solutions, technological, etcetera. I don’t have the answer today. My 
goal today is, because this worries me and keeps me up at night, I want 
you all to be up at night too. But in terms of legal response, I do think that 
we’ve lost our way. I think Sorrell—no doubt we disagree in this room 
about Sorrell—I think Sorrell was a step away from the right direction.66 
I think in terms of the history of hypocrisy—and another plug for David 
and Ron’s book is that it’s a terrific history of technology and a terrific 
history of hypocrisy that I found very compelling. But I think the Court’s 
contemporary free speech doctrine in this area is in fact itself 
hypocritically claiming to protect listeners’ interests when it’s really not. 
It’s protecting powerful speakers’ interests. 
Silverman: In the back? State your name. 
Chris: It’s Chris. Do you see your anti-trolling technology as 
something disseminating information? 
Skover: Well, I’m not an engineer. I’m not a technologist. But I 
would assume that it could be either. It depends entirely on the need that 
is presented and how the technology is designed. I’m speaking completely 
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off the cuff here, but arguably one could achieve somewhat of the same 
result either way depending on what the information is. If I filter out 
information entirely from foreign bots, I may be achieving the same result 
as if I produce truthful information that counters the misinformation that 
was purveyed during the 2016 elections. So, I would say: What’s the 
difference if the end result is the elimination of foreign influence in our 
elections? 
Silverman: I think we have time for one more question. Ryan, did 
you have a question earlier? You pass? Okay. 
Mike: I’m Mike. I think I too am in favor of more information is 
better. This goes by the technological fix, just kind of adding on. Given 
the information asymmetries and access like the Russian government, for 
example, I’m just wondering if you are going against foes that are putting 
out this information that had that kind of access to the data, access the 
technology and the know-how, how does that work in real life? I’m putting 
too much on you. 
Skover: Again, I’m not a techie. I’m not an engineer. But as I 
understand the Russian problem, what would make it more difficult to 
identify and limit the misinformation from a foreign bot is that the 
information was coming through social media platforms with American 
identities. The bots were identifying themselves and setting up accounts 
as American citizens. So, I see how the news reports on the Russian 
interference play into what you are talking about. I certainly don’t have a 
technological answer for it at this point, but here I completely agree with 
Helen on the matter of disclosure. I don’t think there is a First Amendment 
problem, as a general matter, with the disclosure of bot-producing speech, 
assuming we understand that the bot is “speaking” for itself. 
Johnson: I actually agree with David that there is a technological 
fix. When I wrote my materials about a year and a half ago, I hadn’t seen 
evidence of this, but if you look at things like Hamilton 68 generated by 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, ironically, the Marshall 
Fund was created by the United States government to restore Germany’s 
democracy in 1947 and 1948, and the German Marshall Fund was created 
to help, as it turns out now, America to sort of preserve its democracy. It 
created a mechanism for finding out—I check every day—what the bots 
are doing these days based upon the analysis done by Hamilton 68, which 
was created by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. So, I can 
figure out what level of speech is being pushed. A few weeks ago, it was 
“release the memo.” So, I knew that the newest memo deal was one that 
the Russian bots were very much behind, and that gave me a chance to 
evaluate exactly what was going on in that particular activity. So, I think 
we’re starting to develop these types of technological fixes. They are not 
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perfect, but they are certainly better than government regulation, which, 
as all of us will concede, is fairly generally ill-considered in this context. 
Silverman: Well, I think that wraps up the panel. 
 
